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CALIFORNIA'S RULE OF VICARIOUS
EXCLUSION: WHO MAY CHALLENGE THE
CONSTABLE'S ERRORS?
Mark B. Simons*
INTRODUCTION
State and federal courts historically have identified the
proper limits of police investigation through interpretation of
search and seizure rules.' The so-called "exclusionary rule" is
not itself a limitation on police conduct, but rather a judicially
created method of enforcement. Evidence discovered as a re-
sult of illegal police activity is excluded from trials. The fre-
quency of this judicial review is affected by the existence of a
standing requirement that reduces the number of defendants
who may properly challenge any police action.' Thus, in federal
court, only a "person aggrieved" by a search can challenge it,,
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1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Similar provisions are found in the constitutions or
laws of all states. Atkinson, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained Through Unreasona-
ble Searches and Seizures, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 11 (1925).
2. In Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978), the Supreme Court abandoned use
of the standing terminology in criminal cases, while conceding that this in no way
changed the result of any of its previous decisions. It concluded that the only issue was
whether the defendant's personal right to be free from an unlawful search had been
violated. Id. at 427-28. It did concede that standing could be an issue in some cases.
Id. at 426 n.4.
In general, standing in federal court is premised on article El of the United States
Constitution, which limits judicial power to "cases" and "controversies." At the very
least this requires that a litigant be injured in fact by any action he sues to enjoin.
See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Whether the federal courts require more is open
to question. In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150 (1970), the Court added to this constitutional minimum the requirement
that "the interest sought to be protected ... [be] arguably within the zone of inter-
ests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion." Id. at 153. The second prerequisite has been criticized, K. DAVis, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW TEXT § 22.07 (1973), and there is some indication that in more recent cases
the Court has all but eliminated it. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617
(1971); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970) (per curiam). See generally
Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HAav. L. REv. 645,
660-69 (1973).
3. Rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in pertinent
part, that: "A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the
319
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and the use of evidence against a federal defendant is not, in
itself, a sufficient injury to permit an objection to the police
discovery of it.'
Despite the substantial controversy over this limitation on
challenges to police conduct," California remains the only state
that ostensibly has eliminated the standing requirement.' Be-
cause California's approach permits a defendant to suppress
evidence in his case by raising vicariously the privacy violation
of a third person, it has been denominated the "vicarious exclu-
sion" rule.'
district court . . . for the return of the property on the ground that he is entitled to
lawful possession of the property which was illegally seized." The three leading federal
cases on standing to object to an unlawful search and seizure are Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960), Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), and Rakas
v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978). From these cases it appears that a person has
"automatic" standing if he is charged with a crime that includes as an essential
element possession of the evidence seized, with a right to possession at the time of the
seizure. In addition, those defendants who can establish that their privacy was invaded
by the search or seizure have standing. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488
(1976); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229 (1973).
4. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
5. See, e.g., Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U.
CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970); Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under the Fourth
Amendment, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 421 (1975); Weeks, Standing to Object in the Field
of Search and Seizure, 6 Amiz. L. REv. 65 (1964); Comment, Standing to Suppress
Evidence Obtained by Unconstitutional Search and Seizure, 55 MICH. L. REv. 567
(1957).
6. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 204 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court has infrequently waived a standing requirement, though never in
a criminal case. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); NAACP v. Ala-
bama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). Although these
cases involve widely variant subject matter, one common factor that may have led the
Court to permit a person to sue for the violation of a third party's rights was the
difficulty the possessor would have had in asserting them. See generally Sedler,
Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599,
627-28 (1962).
7. Thus in California, it has been said that 'a seizure is either legal or illegal,
regardless of the person against whom the prosecution seeks to introduce the evidence
. . . .' [citation omitted]. The identity of the defendant is a neutral factor." Shuey
v. Superior Ct., 30 Cal. App. 3d 535, 543, 106 Cal. Rptr. 452, 457 (1973) (citing People
v. Superior Ct. (Pierson), 274 Cal. App. 2d 228, 231, 78 Cal. Rptr. 830, 832 (1969)):
While California has eliminated standing, the United States Supreme Court has been
narrowing the class of defendants who can rely on the exclusionary rule. Thus in Jones
v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960), the Court seemed to indicate that targets
of the search would have standing even if their privacy was not invaded:
In order to qualify as a "person aggrieved by an unlawful search and
seizure" one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against
whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims
prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered . ...
This so-called "target doctrine" was expressly repudiated in Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-76 (1969).
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948), appeared to give a defendant
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In an increasing number of areas, however, the California
courts have imposed a standing requirement, at times without
considering either the vicarious exclusion rule or the policies
underlying it. This threatens the primary justifications for the
doctrine by decreasing judicial economy and by increasing in-
centives to search illegally. After a discussion of the policies
behind the vicarious exclusion rule, this article will focus on its
application in the past two decades. The existence and effects
of a reemerging standing requirement are analyzed along with
the factors that may account for its continuing vitality. The
article concludes that, having made the correct decision to
eliminate standing, the California courts have not been able to
do so consistently.
THE BASIS OF VICARIOUS EXCLUSION
California adopted the exclusionary rule in People v.
Cahan' six years before the Supreme Court in Mapp v. Ohio'
required all states to suppress the fruits of unreasonable
searches and seizures. Six months after Cahan, the California
Supreme Court first faced the vicarious exclusion issue in
People v. Martin. 1o In that case, the police entered an office and
found the defendant with bookmaking paraphernalia. Al-
though Martin denied an interest in either the office or the
items seized, the court granted him standing to argue that the
entry was illegal and that the evidence discovered should be
suppressed."
standing to contest the search of a codefendant. This was dispelled in Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
8. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
9. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
10. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
11. Id. The defendant claimed that he had been paid one day's wages to sit in
the office and answer the phone. Whether considered an employee or a guest, he was
legitimately on the premises. At the time Martin was decided, this was insufficient to
warrant standing in federal court, although Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960), changed that result. In Martin, the court could have permitted the defendant's
challenge without totally abrogating standing by taking the approach later adopted in
Jones. It rejected this approach in favor of the vicarious exclusion rule.
Since Martin, the California Supreme Court has reconsidered the vicarious exclu-
sion rule only once in Kaplan v. Superior Ct., 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr.
649 (1971). In Kaplan, the court rejected the argument that the California legislature
had intended to repeal Martin silently by its adoption of the Evidence Code. That code
nowhere mentioned standing but did provide that: "Except as otherwise provided by
statute, all relevant evidence is admissible." CAL. Evm. CODE § 351 (West 1965).
Although Martin was not embodied in any statute, the court had little difficulty in
dispensing with the contention, finding that vicarious exclusion was too integral a part
of the criminal law to be "overruled by any vague and indecisive provision in the
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Consonance With the Goals of the Exclusion Doctrine
Rationale for Suppression. The court, in Martin, based
vicarious exclusion on what might be considered a philosophi-
cal plane; it found that the logic of its decision to exclude in
one case of police misconduct required exclusion in all.Suppression of illegally obtained evidence can be justified
by three theories.12 In the first, the protection against unreason-
able searches is analogized to the right against self-
incrimination. Exclusion then serves to prevent only those pri-
vacy violations that are coupled with an attempt to incriminate
the victim with the evidence uncovered. 3 At the time People
v. Cahan" and People v. Martin'5 were decided, this rationale
was prevalent in lower federal court decisions endorsing sup-
pression as a remedy for police misconduct.
Exclusion is also justified on the basis that it preserves
"judicial dignity" by allowing the judiciary to separate itself
from the illegal acts. This rationale has never been the sole
basis for any court decision adopting exclusion,"5 but it has
frequently supplemented the third rationale-deterrence of
future illegality. Under the deterrence theory, it is assumed
that police investigation is directed primarily at securing con-
victions and that suppression removes the incentive for acting
in a proscribed manner.
The California Supreme Court, in Cahan, rejected the
lower federal court rule and relied on the latter two theories in
adopting exclusion, stating:
Evidence Code - nor do we believe that the Legislature so intended." 6 Cal. 3d at
161, 491 P.2d at 8, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 656 (citing People v. Starr, 11 Cal. App. 3d 574,
583, 89 Cal. Rptr. 906, 912 (1970)). Kaplan did not discuss whether the legislature had
the power to jettison Martin. One commentator has concluded it does not. Comment,
The Vicarious Exclusionary Rule in California, 24 STAN. L. REv. 947 (1972). Legislation
to that end has been introduced but never adopted. See, e.g., S.B. 451, Cal. Legis.,
1977-1978 Reg. Seas. (1977).
12. Professor Amsterdam proposes two different perspectives on the fourth
amendment. It can be viewed as "a collection of protections of atomistic spheres of
interest of individual citizens or as a regulation of governmental conduct." Amster-
dam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 367 (1974).
13. See generally Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and
Seizure, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 342, 347-48 (1967).
14. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
15. 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
16. The theory first appeared in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914),
which first prohibited the use of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment in federal prosecutions. Professor Kamisar has recently urged reliance on this
theory as a preferred basis for exclusion. Kamisar, Is the Exclusionary Rule an
'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment?, 62 Jun. 66 (1978).
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Exclusion of the evidence cannot be justified as af-
fording protection or recompense to the defendant ....
It does not protect the defendant from the search and sei-
zure, since that illegal act has already occurred. If he is
innocent or if there is ample evidence to convict him with-
out the illegally obtained evidence, exclusion of the evi-
dence gives him no remedy at all . . . . We have been
compelled to reach that conclusion [to exclude] because
other remedies have completely failed to secure compli-
ance with the constitutional provisions on the part of po-
lice officers with the attendant result that the courts under
the old rule have been constantly required to participate
in, and in effect condone, the lawless activities of law en-
forcement officers . . . . [When] courts respect the con-
stitutional provisions by refusing to sanction their viola-
tion they will not only command the respect of law abiding
citizens for themselves adhering to the law, they will also
arouse public opinion as a deterrent to lawless enforcement
of the law by bringing just criticism to bear on law enforce-
ment officers who allow criminals to escape by pursuing
them in lawless ways.1
While a standing requirement is implicit in a system based
on the victim incrimination theory, it is antithetical to one
based on judicial dignity and deterrence. When presented with
the standing issue in Martin, the court found its decision fore-
closed by the reasoning of Cahan:
[I]f law enforcement officers are allowed to evade the ex-
clusionary rule by obtaining evidence in violation of the
rights of third parties, its deterrent effect is to that extent
nullified. Moreover, such a limitation virtually invites law
enforcement officers to violate the rights of third parties
and to trade the escape of a criminal whose rights are
violated for the conviction of others by the use of the evi-
dence illegally obtained against them."8
Vicarious exclusion is therefore more compatible with the
deterrent purpose of suppression. If vicarious exclusion is also
to be considered a wise rule, two related inquiries must produce
affirmative answers: does exclusion actually deter unlawful
17. 44 Cal. 2d at 443, 445, 449, 282 P.2d 905, 910-11, 914. The United States
Supreme Court seems to base its use of the exclusionary rule on a deterrence theory.
See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,
222 (1960); Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34
U. Cm. L. REV. 342, 352 (1967).
18. 45 Cal. 2d at 760, 290 P.2d at 857.
1979]
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police conduct, and does the elimination of standing increase
this deterrent effect?
Exclusion as a Deterrent to Police Misconduct. When sim-
ply stated, the deterrent effect of the suppression doctrine
makes great sense." Critics, however, have correctly noted that
the rule directly deters police misconduct only in those investi-
gations where prosecution is the chief goal.20 Even in those
cases that are prosecuted, certain assumptions are made by
proponents of exclusion. For example, there is good reason to
believe that police officers are sometimes more interested in
arrests than convictions.2 In addition, deterrence depends on
a well-informed police force. There is little reliable data on the
extent to which police officers are told of new search and sei-
zure rulings, or of the accuracy of the information they receive.
More important, however, than the assumptions implicit
in the deterrence argument is the conduct encouraged by exclu-
sion. The rule not only assumes that the police are interested
in the final outcome of the case and in learning about legal
restrictions on their investigatory power, it promotes this inter-
est. Even if the assumptions are incorrect, the rule encourages
the prosecutorial officials who have the appropriate power to
rectify the situation. It is their interests that are sacrificed if
19. "It is a logical enough theory, impregnable in the library." Waite,
Evidence-Police Regulation by Rules of Evidence, 42 MICH. L. REv. 679, 685 (1944).
20. See Oaks, supra note 5. Prostitution and gambling are examples of crimes
in which police harassment of violators may be the primary objective. Often the recov-
ery of stolen property is of paramount concern, and the willingness to forego prosecu-
tion nullifies the inhibitive effect of exclusion. Moreover, since contraband is not
returned even if the search is illegal, it may seem preferable to an officer to make a
stop when he has a hunch that the one detained is in possession of narcotics or weap-
ons. Although he may be unable to justify the seizure in court, In re Tony C., 21 Cal.
3d 888, 582 P.2d 957, 148 Cal. Rptr. 366 (1978), the officer will have removed contra-
band from the streets.
In his exhaustive article on the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule, Professor
Oaks explores in detail the assumptions behind the adoption of exclusion and collects
those few empirical studies which had then been made. Oaks, supra; see also Spiotto,
Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives,
2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some
New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974); Kami-
sar, A Defense of the Exclusionay Rule, 15 CriM. L. BULL. 5, 35-39 (1979). Generally it
has not been easy to test empirically the deterrent effect of exclusion because of the
difficulty in isolating the exclusionary rule from other causative factors and in measur-
ing its influence in any reliable way. The rule seems to have had a positive effect on
police training. Nagel, Testing the Effects of Excluding Illegally Seized Evidence, 1965
Wis. L. REv. 283. In addition, police awareness of constitutional limitations has in-
creased. Oaks, supra at 708. Finally, it appears that the effectiveness of exclusion is
higher in more serious cases. J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL 228 (1966).
21. J. SKOLNICK, supra note 20, at 264-65.
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they fail to do so. Thus, while the exclusionary rule may now
have an imperfect deterrent effect, its very existence should
serve to improve the situation.
The Effect of Standing on Deterrence. Some who accept
the deterrent effect of exclusion see no need to eliminate stand-
ing. They argue that vicarious exclusion does not increase de-
terrence because its underlying premise is incorrect. These
opponents recoil at the image, implicit in Martin, of the sophis-
ticated, amoral officer who in a calculating fashion accepts the
invitation to violate the rights of third parties and to trade the
escape of a criminal whose rights are violated for the conviction
of others.22 This notion is particularly hard to accept, since in
suppression hearings, courts routinely resolve credibility dis-
putes in the officer's favor. Thus, suppression occurs only when
the officer, through ignorance or honesty, admits conduct that
violates privacy.
The extreme variance in the training of police officers and
in their relationship to the community they patrol weakens
behavioral generalizations.2 3 However, there seems to be good
reason to question the extent to which fourth amendment
rights exist independent of the exclusionary rule. Professor
Kamisar has collected an enlightening set of police statements
given in response to the imposition of the exclusionary rule in
their jurisdictions. They echo the remarks of William Parker,
who, when Chief of Police of Los Angeles, lamented the new
restrictions required by exclusion but promised that "[a]s
long as the exclusionary rule is the law of California, your po-
lice will respect it and operate to the best of their ability within
the framework of limitations imposed by that rule."2 5 Professor
Skolnick's study of the police suggests that when they are un-
concerned with exclusion, the police are not troubled by violat-
ing a suspect's fourth amendment rights. 2 Even district attor-
neys have been known to phrase their advice to the police in
terms of exclusion, not privacy.27 The lesson from this seems
22. 45 Cal. 2d at 760, 290 P.2d at 857.
23. See, e.g., J. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE BEHAVIOR (1969).
24. See Kamisar, supra note 16, at 71-73.
25. W. PARKER, PARKER ON POLICE 117 (1957) (emphasis added).
26. See J. SKOLNICK, supra note 20, at 139-49, 223. This is prevalent in narcotics
cases where, routinely, the police violate the rights of minor violators to obtain infor-
mation about their sources.
27. In People v. Superior Ct. (Cook), 84 Cal. App. 3d 491, 148 Cal. Rptr. 704
(1978), the California Court of Appeals recently considered a case involving electronic
surveillance conducted without judicial authorization. The officer who conducted the
surveillance had testified that before doing so
19791 325
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clear: judicial failure to punish misconduct by exclusion is
viewed by the police as a sanction of their behavior. 8 There-
fore, a standing limitation seems likely to increase police disre-
gard of the rights of those who are searched in order to find
evidence that can also be used against a third person.
In its rejection of vicarious exclusion in Alderman v.
United States,2" the United States Supreme Court did not go
so far as to claim that there is no deterrence lost by requiring
standing. Rather, the Court concluded that the additional de-
terrence is "minimal" and insufficient to justify the social
cost." Since the amount of additional deterrence resulting from
vicarious exclusion has never been quantified, it is difficult to
argue with the Court's conclusion.
"Minimal deterrence" has not been an easily applied mea-
sure. For example, in Kaufman v. United States,3' decided two
weeks after Alderman, the Court held that the failure to object
to a search at or before trial did not preclude raising it in a
federal post-conviction proceeding. The government had
argued unsuccessfully that the minimal additional deterrence
resulting from this new opportunity to object did not justify the
release of any guilty persons."2 Recently, the Court changed its
mind and denied post-conviction relief in the same situation,
finding that the deterrence was, in fact, insufficient.3 3 No data
explaining this shift accompanied the opinion. Regardless of
the correctness of either decision, the shift demonstrates the
problem in predicating the existence of the exclusionary rule on
he talked to a deputy district attorney in the San Luis Obispo District
Attorney's office . . . and that the deputy district attorney, after calling
back, said that the use of the electronic surveillance equipment was all
right, provided that the case against the suspects was not completely
dependent upon what was overheard with the equipment.
Id. at 497, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 708 (emphasis added). The deputy district attorney
apparently did not deny that this accurately reflected his advice, although he thought
he gave it after the defendant's arrest and not prior to the surveillance. Id.
28. Kamisar reports the following statement made by a detective in St. Paul,
Minnesota:
No officer lied upon the witness stand. If you were asked how you got your
evidence, you told the truth. You had broken down a door or pried a
window open . . . often we picked locks. . . . The Supreme Court of
Minnesota sustained this time after time. [The] judiciary okayed it;
they knew what the facts were.
Kamisar, supra note 16, at 71-72. But see Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421, 437 (1978)
(White, J., dissenting).
29. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
30. Id. at 175.
31. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
32. Id. at 225-26.
33. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
[Vol. 19
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a calculation of the apparently incalculable.
The decision in Alderman was couched in terms that sug-
gested that standing balances the competing social interests in
deterring unlawful searches and reducing the costs inherent in
excluding relevant evidence of guilt. This is insupportable.
Whether a person has standing depends largely on his relation-
ship to the premises searched or item seized. Neither the seri-
ousness of the crime charged," the nature of the law enforce-
ment misconduct, nor the officer's expectation that the person
would be prosecuted with the evidence unlawfully obtained are
taken into account. Standing simply reduces the number of
occasions that an illegally obtained item is suppressed. Its ef-
fect on police deterrence and the costs to society are completely
random.
Debating the additional deterrent effect of vicarious exclu-
sion ignores the likelihood that the imposition of standing
threatens the efficacy of exclusion itself by making its applica-
tion less certain. An officer who knows that the results of an
improper search. will be suppressed is less likely to undertake
it than one who is unsure. There is a useful analogy in the
exclusion of statements obtained in violation of the Miranda
rule.5 For several years after Miranda, it was unclear whether
a statement obtained without the required warnings could be
used to impeach a defendant who testified. In People v. Nudd,8
the California Supreme Court ruled it could be so used. In
People v. Disbrow,37 decided two years after Nudd, the supreme
court reversed its position. During the period when Nudd con-
trolled, there appeared to be a marked increase in police inter-
rogation after a defendant had invoked his right to silence.3
Undoubtedly, the police recognized that such a practice could
only be beneficial. If the police ceased questioning the defen-
dant, there would be no statement; continuing the interroga-
tion might lead to an admission which would hamper the sus-
pect's ability to testify in his defense at trial.
In many situations, the police are faced with searching
34. It is noteworthy that the United States Supreme Court has recently rejected
the argument that the seriousness of the offense itself can excuse a warrant. In Mincey
v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978), the Court reversed the defendant's murder conviction
and found that there is no murder scene exception to the warrant requirement.
35. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
36. 12 Cal. 3d 204, 524 P.2d 844, 115 Cal. Rptr. 372 (1972).
37. 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
38. Letter from Charles H. James, Chief Trial Deputy, Contra Costa County
Public Defender's Office, to Santa Clara Law Review (Mar. 8, 1979) [on file at SANTA
CLARA L. REV.].
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either on questionable grounds or not searching at all. In the
investigation of narcotics offenses or crimes involving multiple
defendants, officers are likely to believe that persons other than
the privacy victims can be prosecuted with any evidence dis-
covered. If court decisions permit the use of unlawfully ob-
tained evidence against non-victims, there are incentives for an
officer to conduct the search. Studies confirm that the removal
of incentives can deter conduct, but that this method of behav-
ior modification is more likely to fail if not followed methodi-
cally.3' Use of a standing requirement to insulate some searches
from judicial review will inevitably have that effect.
Thus, the exclusionary rule seems likely to inhibit future
police illegality at least in those areas where prosecution is the
presumed result of the investigation. In other areas, the ineffec-
tiveness of suppression is not so much an argument against
that doctrine as an argument for an additional sanction to
supplement it. Moreover, the elimination of standing makes
judicial review of every unlawful search available in cases pro-
secuted. While the additional deterrent effect of these extra
challenges is unknown, a contrary rule would make the imposi-
tion of sanctions more haphazard and threaten to undermine
the entire deterrent effect of suppression.
Practical Difficulties with a Standing Requirement
Although the court in Martin discussed only the philo-
sophical basis for the rejection of a standing requirement, it is
likely that practical considerations played a role in the deci-
sion, and that they continue to buttress the doctrine. At the
time Martin was decided, fewer than half the states excluded
evidence found in an unreasonable search. 0 The only well-
developed body of the law on the standing question evolved
from lower federal court decisions. Those opinions justified ex-
clusion as a remedy for a wrong done to a particular defendant,
and permitted only those so wronged to benefit. The ease in
stating this rule belies the difficulties the courts had in apply-
ing it.
Anomalies in the Federal Rule. In determining whether a
defendant had sufficient interest in the premises searched,
common law property rules were exalted over attempts to de-
termine the nature of the privacy protected by the fourth
39. See, e.g., A. BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION 225-29, 338-46
(1969).
40. See Annot., 50 A.L.R.2d 531, 535-36 (1956).
[Vol. 19
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amendment. Substantial time was spent categorizing particu-
lar defendants as owner, lessors, lessees, guests, bailees, tres-
passers, and the like. It was then necessary to determine which
of these categories had sufficient interest to challenge the evi-
dence in a particular case. Not until five years after Martin, in
Jones v. United States," did the United States Supreme Court
define the area more exactly, rejecting the "gossamer" distinc-
tions of the common law and finding that anyone legitimately
on the premises when a search occurred could challenge its
legality.'
The determination of who had sufficient interest in the
item seized was also unsatisfactory. Several courts ruled that
no one could have a possessory interest in contraband, includ-
ing stolen items.'3 Needless to say, this immunized a large
number of searches from judicial review. Moreover, to establish
standing in federal court, the defendant often had to provide
key evidence against himself on the issue of guilt by proving his
control over the contraband. Though Justice Traynor did not
mention it, the court in Martin may have been loathe to subject
itself to the tender mercies of a doctrine that forced a defendant
to admit his guilt or forego his right to challenge a search. The
dilemma, avoided by the rejection of standing, was poignantly
described by Judge Learned Hand:
Men may wince at admitting that they were the own-
ers, or in possession, of contraband property; may wish at
once to secure the remedies of a possessor, and avoid the
perils of the part; but equivocation will not serve. If they
come as victims, they must take on that role, with enough
detail to cast them without question. The petitioners at
bar shrank from that predicament; but they were obliged
to choose one horn of the dilemma."
Again, this dilemma was not alleviated until the United States
Supreme Court's decisions in Jones and Simmons v. United
41. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
42. Id. at 266-67. The recent decision in Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978),
may undermine this. Rakas rejected the Jones rule that gave standing to anyone
legitimately on the premises and replaced it with a more ambiguous standard. Despite
the denials of the majority, it seems likely that the lower federal courts will utilize
common law property concepts to refine this ambiguity.
43. This position may still be the law except in those situations where the crime
charged is possession of the contraband. United States v. Sacco, 436 F.2d 780 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 834 (1971); see also United States v. Oates, 460 F.2d 45, 55 n.6
(2d Cir. 1977); see generally Trager & Lobenfeld, The Law of Standing Under the
Fourth Amendment, 41 BROOKLYN L. REv. 421, 436-44 (1975).
44. Connolly v. Medalie, 58 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1932).
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States," decided several years after Martin." Thus Martin's
rejection of standing may have been caused as much by the
practical problems then inherent in the doctrine as by the logi-
cal implications of the court's reliance on deterrence as the
justification for exclusion.
Even today numerous anomalies exist in the application of
the standing requirement. Consider a situation where A, while
a guest in B's home, hides a pistol on a window ledge. Under
questionable circumstances, the police enter and find the
weapon. If A is charged with possession of the pistol, he has
automatic standing and can challenge the search without es-
tablishing any connection to the premises or the weapon.47 If,
however, A is charged with murder and the primary evidence
against him is the pistol and related ballistics testimony, he
does not have automatic standing and must establish a suffi-
cient relationship to the premises or gun before he can chal-
lenge the police entry." If A testifies that he was on the prem-
ises at the time of the search at B's invitation, he will have
standing, unless he is a mere "casual visitor."" That term has
not yet been defined and may deny standing to all but a person
who has slept on the premises and has a key, or it may deny
standing only to a person there for a few moments. ° If A is more
than a "casual visitor" but goes to the store for a pack of
cigarettes returning moments later when the search is com-
45. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
46. To avoid Hand's dilemma, Jones had held that a person charged with certain
possessory crimes had automatic standing. See note 3 supra. Simmons sought to avoid
the problem more completely by holding that testimony given by the defendant at the
hearing on the suppression motion could not be introduced against him during the
prosecution's case-in-chief. Although Simmons did not discuss use of this testimony
against the defendant to impeach contradictory testimony he gave at trial, there seems
good reason to believe it would be admissible for this purpose. First, Walder v. United
States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954), held that illegally seized evidence could be used against
the defendant to impeach him after he testified and generally denied the charges. In
additon, a statement obtained in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
can be used to impeach a defendant whose trial testimony conflicts with it. Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). But see People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d
272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
The Supreme Court has suggested that Simmons may have obviated the need for
automatic standing. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 228-29 (1973). If the defen-
dant can be impeached by his testimony at the pre-trial hearing, a need for the
continued vitality of the automatic standing rule seems to exist.
47. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 263-65 (1960) (unless of course auto-
matic standing no longer exists). See note 46 supra.
48. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. at 265-67.
49. Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978).
50. Id. at 429-30.
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plete, he would be without standing," unless, of course, he
admitted that the weapon was his.52 All of this testimony is
highly relevant in A's trial. Though it could not be used in the
prosecution's case-in-chief or to rebut the inconsistent testi-
mony of an alibi witness, it would appear to be admissible to
counter inconsistent testimony by A.5 Finally, if B was also
charged in connection with the homicide, he could move to
suppress the pistol though he never knew A brought it to his
house and if asked, would deny he had ever seen the weapon
before ."'
Vicarious exclusion eliminates these anomalies as well as
the court hearings necessary to sort out the facts underlying
them." In addition, there is no need to decide whether the
courts or the defendant must be trapped in the dilemma that
results when a person seeks to suppress evidence that he will
deny any connection with at trial.56 Finally, this can be done
without sacrificing one important virtue of a standing require-
ment, an adversary proceeding. It is obvious that a criminal
defendant can be relied on to attack vigorously the admissibil-
ity of any evidence used to convict him, whether or not he was
a victim of the search that led to its discovery.
An Alternative: The Expanded Target Doctrine. Numer-
ous alternatives to the federal rule of standing have been pro-
51. See United States v. Maroney, 220 F. Supp. 801 (1963); Trager & Lobenfeld,
The Law of Standing Under the Fourth Amendment, 41 BROoKLYN L. Rav. 421, 445-
48 (1975).
52. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. at 171-73.
53. See note 46 supra.
54. As the owner of the house, B has a substantial interest in the premises and
has standing regardless of his connection to the weapon. Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. at 265-67. Of course, if C owned the house and rented it to B, B would still have
standing, although C would not.
55. That federal standing is somewhat confused is evident. The Supreme Court
has recently criticized the ambiguity of the Jones test and the anomalous decisions
resulting from it. Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. at 431 & n.13, 432 & n.14. The rule set
out in Rakas is apt to be more difficult to interpret. Those who seek to maintain a
standing requirement see this lack of clarity as a boon. See White & Greenspan,
Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. Rv. 333, 355-56 (1970);
Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. Cm. L.
REv. 342, 358 (1967). They argue quite cogently that a clear standing rule would
accomplish nothing so much as signalling the police as to whom they could search with
impunity. Presumably the more ambiguous the standing rule is, the more it operates
like vicarious exclusion. The costs to the judiciary both in time and dignity from
wrestling with this ambiguity are not discussed.
56. Presently, if the defendant testifies at the hearing but not at the trial, the
hearing testimony cannot be introduced by the prosecution even if the defense is
inconsistent with it. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968). If, however, the
defendant testifies at trial in a manner inconsistent with his previous testimony it
apparently can be introduced. See note 46 supra.
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posed, but only one appears to be a realistic effort to relate
standing directly to deterrence.57 According to that proposal:
"If a reasonable man in the officer's position at the time of the
search would seek to obtain evidence against either the defen-
dant or the class of people to which the defendant belongs, the
defendant has standing." 58
57. One other alternative would treat the objection to illegally obtained items as
an evidentiary privilege and govern standing by the same rules that determine who is
a "holder" of a privilege. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE 153-54 (2d ed. 1972);
Comment, Standing to Suppress Evidence Obtained by an Unconstitutional Search
and Seizure, 55 MICH. L. REv. 567, 578 (1957). This simply substitutes labeling for
analysis and assumes the answer to the question. Evidentiary privileges have always
been thought of as personal, and so, vicarious exercise of them is not permitted. This
does not help determine whether an objection to illegally obtained evidence should be
treated in the same way, however.
One commentator has suggested permitting vicarious exclusion in those situations
where the victim is unable to challenge the search. Comment, Standing to Object to
an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CI. L. REv. 342, 359-61 (1967). This
proposal would bring vicarious exclusion into line with those other United States
Supreme Court cases that permit the third party exercise of constitutional rights. See
note 6 supra. Presumably the privacy victim is unavailable if he is not prosecuted.
Even if unprosecuted, he would be permitted by this proposal to waive the illegality
and effectively deny the defendant standing. This proposal seems to ignore the fact
that the police often search or arrest minor violators primarily to obtain information
against more serious offenders. See note 26 and accompanying text supra. In such
situations, dismissal of the charges against the privacy victim may not be a sufficient
disincentive to deter future illegality.
58. White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 118 U. PA.
L. Rsv. 333, 353 (1970). This proposal was adopted as a compromise by the American
Law Institute in its proposed official draft of its Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure. A.L.I., A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 290.1(5) (April
15, 1975) (Draft). The reporters had urged the California rule eliminating standing, id.
at 561, but the council opposed that view, id. at 560. The compromise that resulted
provided:
(5) Standing. A motion to suppress may be made by any defendant
against whom things seized are to be offered in evidence at a criminal
trial, if such things were obtained by a search of or seizure from
(a) the defendant; or
(b) a spouse, parent, child, brother or sister of the defendant, or
any member of his household, or
(c) any person with whom the defendant resides or sojourns; or
(d) a co-defendant, co-conspirator, or any person chargeable with
the same crime with which the defendant is charged; or
(e) any person with whom the defendant conducts a business; or
(f) any other person if, from the circumstances, it appears that the
search or seizure was intended to evade the application of this Part
II to any of the persons described in paragraphs (a) to (e) inclusive.
It should be noted that the compromise differs from the White and Greenspan
proposal in two significant ways. First, it adds to those who would have standing those
defendants who have certain business (legal and illegal) and personal relationships
with the privacy victim. Id. § 5(b)-(c). Second, it limits the White and Greenspan
proposal by adding to their requirement (that the defendant be the target) an addi-
tional obligation that the search was undertaken to evade the defendant's standing. It
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The primary advantage of this alternative is that it takes into
account the fact that in certain investigations, primarily those
related to drugs and conspiracies, police either know that oth-
ers in addition to the privacy victim can be prosecuted with the
evidence sought, or hope that this is the case. Thus, in a search
for drugs, a reasonable officer may not know the name of the
privacy victim's source, but he may anticipate that discovery
of the contraband will induce disclosure of the identity of a
person more central to the chain of distribution. If this discov-
ery occurred, the "bigger fish" would also have standing to
attack the search. Though similar to the "target doctrine"' 9
rejected by the Supreme Court in Alderman, this alternative
gives more defendants standing by including those who were
not specifically in the officer's mind at the time of the search
but who could be reasonably included in that class of people
likely to be prosecuted as a result of the search.
Though a significant improvement over federal standing,
this "expanded target doctrine" compares unfavorably to the
California rule. Even its proponents recognize that adoption of
this approach would lead to lengthy hearings about the knowl-
edge, experience, and information possessed by the officer who
conducted the search. 0 Moreover, it is unclear which officer's
knowledge, experience, and information would be relevant. For
example, in United States v. Ceccolini,1I the federal govern-
ment, with the assistance of the local police, had been investi-
gating bookmaking in a small town in upstate New York. For
several months the probe had focused on a small florist shop.
seems likely that this additional obligation would effectively negate the value of the
proposal. In almost all situations, the officer will be able to provide an alternative
explanation for his decision to search the privacy victim, e.g., the victim had the item
sought in the investigation. In the face of such an explanation, it would be unlikely
that the defendant can establish the "evasion" motive necessary to grant him stand-
ing.
59. The target doctrine is defined at note 7 supra.
60. White & Greenspan, supra note 58, at 355. In attacking the target doctrine
in Alderman v. United States, Justice Harland noted the administrative difficulties
that could arise in a wiretapping case:
[T]he rule would entail very substantial administrative difficulties. In
the majority of cases, I would imagine that the police plant a bug with
the expectation that it may well produce leads to a large number of
crimes. A lengthy hearing would, then, appear to be necessary in order
to determine whether the police knew of an accused's criminal activity
at the time the bug was planted and whether the police decision to plant
a bug was motivated by an effort to obtain information against the ac-
cused or some other individual.
394 U.S. at 188 n.1 (concurring opinion).
61. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
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One day, Officer Bora, while at the shop to talk with his girl-
friend, who was an employee, noticed an envelope stuffed with
money on the cash register. He opened it and discovered policy
slips. Later that day he reported his findings to federal agents.
Had standing been an issue in the case, there would have been
a real issue under the proposed alternative as to whose state of
mind would be relevant: Bora's, the other officers' in the local
department, and/or the agents' in the F.B.I. A broad view can
dramatically lengthen the hearing. A narrow view would treat
police officers in a more insular fashion than reality allows or
public policy should encourage.
Finally, the courts would have substantial discretion as to
whether the defendant should be included in the class against
whom the officer sought evidence. It would be difficult, if not
impossible, to rebut an officer's statement that he looked for
narcotics solely to prosecute the possessor without regard for
his source. A court faced with the prospect of freeing a guilty
seller may not be disposed to doubt the officer, or in a more
ambiguous situation, treat the class expansively. Given the
hostility of many trial judges to the exclusionary rule, "the
addition of another especially subjective factual determination
will constitute almost an open invitation to nullification at the
trial court level. ' '62
Since no jurisdiction has ever adopted the expanded targetdoctrine, there has been no opportunity to learn the ease with
which these problems might be solved. The substantial admin-
istrative difficulties entailed by the rule and the likelihood that
its implementation would increase the ambiguity surrounding
standing seem sufficient to reject this alternative.
Summary
Vicarious exclusion is more consistent with the deterrent
goal of the exclusionary rule than either the federal doctrine of
standing or the "expanded target" alternative. Moreover, im-
posing a standing requirement adds an extra and time-
consuming layer to the court hearings on motions to suppress.
Upon close analysis, the insistence on standing, particu-larly at the federal level, appears to be a rejection of exclusion
itself. There is a consistent majority of the United States Su-
preme Court which restricts the range of cases in which an
62. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1027, 1045
(1974).
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illegal search leads to exclusion. The Court has permitted un-
lawfully obtained evidence to be introduced before a grand
jury63 and to be used in impeaching a defendant whose testi-
mony would be contradicted by it.4 If taken by state officers,
such evidence is admissible in a federal civil tax proceeding."6
A sentencing judge can consider unlawfully obtained evi-
dence.6" It appears that a witness' testimony at trial that re-
sults from an unlawful search will not be suppressed, although
a per se rule was rejected. 7 A state prisoner can no longer seek
suppression in a federal habeas proceeding. 8 Finally, there
appears to be some support for denying exclusion when the
officer neither knew nor should have known that the search was
unlawful. 9 Each of these decisions rested on the bald state-
ment that little additional deterrence would result from requir-
ing exclusion.
Although the California approach is more likely to pro-
mote the goals of exclusion with greater judicial economy,
standing will continue to be imposed by those systems that
have lost faith in the efficacy of suppression. To the extent that
standing is imposed because of the belief that suppression is an
ineffective deterrent, the standing requirement guarantees the
accuracy of its own predicate.
CALIFORNIA'S APPLICATION OF VICARIOUS EXCLUSION
California's vicarious exclusion rule is usually described in
the clear terms one reserves for basic doctrine. 0 However, it has
not been applied consistently. After a brief consideration of the
classes of defendants who have been helped by the rule, consid-
63. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
64. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
65. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
66. The United States Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue although three
circuit courts have approved it. United States v. Lee, 540 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 894 (1976); United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir.
1975); United States v. Schipani, 435 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 983
(1970).
67. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
68. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
69. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
70. Ever since People v. Martin .... California has enforced the
so-called "vicarious exclusionary rule," which, in brief, does not require
a defendant who would suppress illegally obtained evidence to prove that
he has "standing" to raise the issue .... California enforce[s] the
exclusionary rule for its deterrent effect, disregarding nice questions of
standing with respect to the particular defendant who moves to suppress.
Shuey v. Superior Ct., 30 Cal. App. 3d 535, 542, 106 Cal. Rptr. 452, 457 (1973).
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eration will be given the cases where a standing requirement
was expressly or silently imposed by the California courts. The
effect of this tenacity and certain reasons for it will be exam-
ined.
Liberal Application of the Basic Doctrine
Vicarious exclusion has been applied in a myriad of cir-
cumstances. On occasion it is relied on although the defendant
would have had standing under the federal rule.7' Vicarious
exclusion permits consideration of the merits in such cases
without a lengthy determination of the standing issue. In addi-
tion, the Martin rule has been used in situations that are con-
sistent with a limited standing rule, although beyond current
federal protection. Thus, in California, defendants may chal-
lenge the search or arrest of co-defendants and accomplices,"
and of spouses.73 Before the decision in Jones v. United States
removed the distinction between defendants with a substantial
property interest and "mere guests,"7 California accorded
these visitors standing. 5 Although subsequent federal decisions
have refused to adopt the target doctrine suggested in Jones,"5
individuals who are the real targets of the search of another
may challenge the search under Martin." Employees of a com-
71. People v. Rodriquez, 274 Cal. App. 2d 770, 79 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1969); People
v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956); People v. Kitchens, 46 Cal. 2d 260, 294
P.2d 17 (1956).
72. People v. Jackson, 254 Cal. App. 2d 655, 62 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1967); People v.
Gonzales, 186 Cal. App. 2d 370, 9 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1960). In Jackson, the police were
investigating a series of thefts at Pacific Gas and Electric Company's substations when
they observed the defendant and Charles Lee acting suspiciously nearby. The two men
fled when the police appeared. After his valid arrest, Jackson told the police the
location of Lee's pickup. A search of that vehicle led to the discovery of bolt cutters,
which were introduced against the defendant. Martin permitted Jackson to challenge
the search of Lee's truck. Although not an issue in the case, one wonders what effect a
consent by Jackson to the search of the truck would have had. Even if it would not
hind Lee, should it not bind Jackson? Or does he get the benefit of the privacy viola-
tion without the victim's power to waive it? No case on this point has been found.
73. People v. Reynolds, 55 Cal. App. 3d 357, 127 Cal. Rptr. 561 (1976).
74. Jones v. United States, 342 U.S. 257 (1960); see text accompanying notes 41,
42 supra.
75. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1956); People v. Colonna, 140
Cal. App. 2d 705, 295 P.2d 490 (1956). In addition, California grants standing to a
guest who is absent from the premises at the time of the search. People v. Rightnour,
243 Cal. App. 2d 663, 52 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1966). There is no federal protection. See text
accompanying note 51 supra.
76. See note 7 supra.
77. See, e.g., People v. Doyle, 77 Cal. App. 3d 126, 141 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1977).
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pany searched by the police may challenge the seizure of re-
cords."
Finally, California permits challenges in situations that
are inconsistent with any notion of limited standing. For exam-
ple, a defendant can challenge a search while denying any
connection with the premises searched or items found." Simi-
larly, courts have permittedan objection without any consider-
ation of the defendant's relationship to the place searched or
the item seized. 0 In addition, under Martin, a defendant may
challenge the search or arrest of an uncharged person when
information that incriminates the defendant comes into police
possession as a result of the search or arrest., Thus, in Kaplan
v. Superior Court,"2 the defendant in a drug sales prosecution
was permitted to challenge the search of a drug purchaser that
resulted in the discovery of the drug allegedly sold. The pur-
chaser had been immunized from prosecution in return for his
testimony against Kaplan. That testimony was also sup-
pressed.
The same result is reached when the information gathered
by the police from the third person aids in their investigation
of the defendant, although it is not evidence against him. In
Ferdin v. Superior Court,3 police arrested and interrogated one
Garcia, who provided enough information for them to obtain a
78. Id.
79. [A] motion under section 1538.5 is directed not to the identity
of the culprit but to the legality of specific items of evidence obtained by
a search and seizure. It is, in a sense, in the nature of a proceeding in rem
against the evidence itself. The only connection that need be shown be-
tween the evidence and the moving party, accordingly, is a sufficient
interest to give the latter standing to make the motion. In the case at bar
standing is provided by the rule in this state that a defendant against
whom incriminating evidence is offered in a criminal prosecution, as here,
has standing to seek its suppression on the ground of illegal search and
seizure.
People v. Gale, 9 Cal. 3d 788, 793, 511 P.2d 1204, 1208, 108 Cal. Rptr. 852, 856 (1973)
(emphasis in original). People v. Wilcox, 276 Cal. App. 2d 414, 81 Cal. Rptr. 60 (1969);
People v. Silva, 140 Cal. App. 2d 791, 295 P.2d 942 (1956).
80. People v. Randall, 33 Cal. App. 3d 523, 109 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1973). The court
also ruled that in a state court prosecution the standing to challenge a search made
by federal customs agents is based on state law. Id. at 527-28, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 146.
In federal court, standing is based on federal law although California officers conduct
the search. United States v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1977).
81. See People v. Peterson, 85 Cal. App. 3d 163, 149 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1978); Ferdin
v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. App. 3d 774, 112 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1974); Kaplan v. Superior
Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971); People v. Ferguson, 214 Cal.
App. 2d 772, 29 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1963).
82. 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
83. 36 Cal. App. 3d 774, 112 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1974).
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search warrant for the defendant's residence. The court
granted the defendant standing to seek suppression of the her-
oin subsequently found at his home on the basis that Garcia's
arrest was invalid and the warrant was a fruit of that arrest.
Ferdin has had an interesting impact on a non-standing
area. As a strategy matter, defendants often seek the names
of any confidential informant connected to a criminal case.
There are a variety of reasons for this, not the least of which is
the hope that the prosecution will refuse to disclose and the
court will then order a dismissal." It has long been held that
defendants can only obtain the names of those informants who
are material on the issue of guilt or innocence; citizens who give
information used by the police only to establish probable cause
for a search warrant are not discloseable on motion by the
defendant." Ferdin opens a significant wedge in this confiden-
tiality. In Theodore v. Superior Court,"6 the California Su-
preme Court suggested that the logic of Martin required disclo-
sure of the name of a "search-warrant informant" when the
defendant seeks to challenge the legality of the search or arrest
of the informant in order to suppress his own search as a fruit
of that primary illegality. 7 Thus, a rule that allows standing
effectively grants a defendant greater discovery rights than he
would otherwise have.
On at least one occasion, vicarious exclusion has been me-
chanically applied, although no standing problem existed. Use
of the doctrine permitted the court to fashion a substantive
limitation on search and seizure without considering certain
negative policy implications. In Shuey v. Superior Court,8 sev-
eral police officers arrived at the house of a reputed drug dealer
and sought permission to search. The occupant, Paul Shuey,
84. The government has a privilege not to disclose the identity of persons who
supply it with information about crimes. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1041 (West 1965). Since
People v. Garcia, 67 Cal. 2d 830, 434 P.2d 366, 64 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1967), it has been
clear that the "privilege must yield when it is shown that the informant ... is a
material witness for the defense and non-disclosure would deprive the defendant of a
fair trial. . . .[Djisclosure must be ordered upon pain of dismissal." Id. at 842, 434
P.2d at 374, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 118 (emphasis in original). Accord, People v. Goliday, 8
Cal. 3d 771, 505 P.2d 537, 106 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1973) (not a material witness); Honore
v. Superior Court, 70 Cal. 2d 162, 449 P.2d 169, 74 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1970).
85. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1042(b) (West 1965). The same rule applies to an individ-
ual who provided the police with information that enabled them to have sufficient
probable cause to conduct a warrantless search and is not a material witness as to guilt
or innocence. Id. § 1042(c).
86. 8 Cal. 3d 77, 501 P.2d 234, 104 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1972).
87. Id. at 104, 501 P.2d at 253-54, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46.
88. 30 Cal. App. 3d 535, 106 Cal. Rptr. 452 (1973).
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refused to consent to the search so one of the officers departed
to obtain a warrant. The other officers remained with Shuey
and undertook a three hour occupation of the residence while
the warrant was prepared. The chief objection to invalidating
the police conduct was that it had interfered only with Paul
Shuey's ability to destroy the contraband that was discovered
when the warrant arrived and was executed. The court was
plainly troubled by the need to rely on a right to destroy evi-
dence, since on other occasions the existence of such a right had
been denied."9 This dilemma was eased by the presence of Mrs.
Shuey, who was also charged. She had been nowhere near the
residence during the occupation and could be granted relief
without discussion of a right to destroy. The court then sup-
pressed the evidence against Mr. Shuey, stating, "Martin and
Kaplan, therefore, demand that 'his' result in this court must
be the same as 'hers' and that we must not be swayed by
disapproval of what Paul would have done, had his visitors
departed at 11 a.m." 0
The court's conclusion that Martin foreclosed any policy
limitation on Mr. Shuey's standing seems faulty. The situation
presented in Shuey was significantly different from that in the
normal vicarious exclusion case, where the defendant is per-
mitted to object to evidence although his privacy has not been
invaded. In Shuey, Paul's privacy was clearly invaded; even
under the federal rule he would have qualified as a "person
aggrieved." The argument against his challenge was not that
he lacked standing but that one should not be able to benefit
by his own wrong. A doctrine designed to ameliorate the stand-
ing problem does not respond to that argument. Shuey should
have provided an opportunity for the court to balance the prob-
lems in approving police impropriety against those inherent in
recognition of a right to destroy. It seems unwise to use a rule
of standing to avoid this issue even if the conclusion reached
is desirable."
Traditional Exceptions to Vicarious Exclusion
Despite its use in a variety of factual contexts, the Califor-
89. See People v. Guthaus, 208 Cal. App. 2d 785, 790, 25 Cal. Rptr. 735, 737-38
(1962); People v. Ruiz, 196 Cal. App. 2d 695, 702, 16 Cal. Rptr. 855, 859 (1961); People
v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 306, 294 P.2d 6, 9 (1956).
90. 30 Cal. App. 3d at 543, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
91. For a consideration of the competing interests, see Griswold, Criminal Proce-
dure, 1969-Is It a Means or an End?, 29 MD. L. Rlv. 307, 317 (1969).
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nia courts have not applied vicarious exclusion without excep-
tion. However, the tenacity of the standing requirement in Cal-
ifornia does not seem to rest on any ambivalence toward the
exclusionary rule. Unlike the United States Supreme Court,92
California's high court has enthusiastically embraced the use
of suppression to enforce its regulation of law enforcement
practices. In contrast to the federal rule, illegally obtained evi-
dence can rarely be used in California to impeach a defendant
who testifies 3 and probably cannot be considered by the sent-
encing judge.9' There is no indication that California courts will
admit a witness' testimony that results from an unlawful
search." Nor has any California case suggested that exclusion
will be denied when the officer neither knew nor should have
known that the search was unlawful."
Nevertheless, the Martin rule has been rejected in a few
particular situations. Since People v. Varnum, 7 it has been
clear that California courts will not permit a defendant to sup-
press another person's statement, or its fruits, on the basis that
it was illegally obtained. In Varnum, the police elicited state-
ments from an in-custody accomplice that led to the discovery
of a murder weapon. Prior to the statements, the suspect was
not informed of her right to remain silent. The defendant
sought to suppress the weapon because it was a fruit of the
illegal interrogation of his accomplice. The court declined to
extend the Martin rule to the fifth and sixth amendment rights
protected by Escobedol" and Miranda," explaining that the
right to counsel and the privilege against self-incrimination are
personal and not violated as long as the evidence uncovered is
not used against the person who made the statements. The
court stated that: "Unlike unreasonable searches and seiz-
ures, which always violate the Constitution, there is nothing
unlawful in questioning an unwarned suspect so long as the
92. See text accompanying notes 63-69 supra.
93. For a discussion of the use of illegally obtained statements and physical
evidence to impeach a defendant in California and federal courts, see People v. Dis-
brow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
94. The California Supreme Court's recent grant of a hearing in People v. Belleci,
July 27, 1978, CR. 20604, would seem to so indicate.
95. Compare text accompanying note 67 supra, with Kaplan v. Superior Court,
6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
96. But see text accompanying note 69 supra.
97. 66 Cal. 2d 808, 427 P.2d 772, 59 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1967).
98. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
99. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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police refrain from physically and psychologically coercive
tactics condemned by due process and do not use against the
suspect any evidence obtained.""'
While it is questionable whether the philosophical basis for
excluding a statement logically compels a standing require-
ment,'0 ' it is manifest that such a requirement does not produce
the same problems it creates in the fourth amendment area; no
complex determination as to whether the defendant is a pri-
vacy victim need be made when an interrogation rather than a
search is challenged. Only the person who made the statement
can object to it. In addition, a practical argument never men-
tioned by the court provides a sufficient basis for the distinc-
tion between Martin and Varnum. Witnesses to a crime who
know the location of hidden evidence are likely to have some
connection with the suspect. Arguably, the witness would vio-
late one or more provisions of the Penal Code if he was initially
reluctant to disclose the location of the items to the police.10
Extending vicarious exclusion to Miranda violations would
convert every defense attorney into a prosecutor, searching the
Penal Code for crimes the officer could have charged against
the witness. Once found, the Penal Code violations would pro-
vide the basis for arguing that the witness was a suspect at the
time of the interrogation, and that the failure to warn the wit-
ness/suspect of his rights precludes use of the evidence he
helped the police find.
In search and seizure cases, the California courts have de-
nied use of the vicarious exclusion doctrine to one discrete and
easily identifiable segment of the population. It is standard to
100. 66 Cal. 2d at 812-13, 427 P.2d at 776, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 112.
101. The refusal to extend vicarious exclusion to this area is usually explained
on the basis that fifth amendment rights are "personal" while the fourth amendment
prescribes a code of governmental conduct for the protection of all persons. See, e.g.,
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 205 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting). The
language of the two constitutional provisions does not make this manifest. Initially,
federal courts viewed search and seizure violations as "personal." Also, it is far from
certain that California excludes invalid confessions solely to aid the victim without
concern for the deterrent effect on police practices. In People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d
101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976), the court denied a statement taken in
violation of Miranda to impeach a defendant. It concluded that a contrary result
would prompt future Miranda violations and that the court's own dignity would be im-
paired by use of such a statement. Id. at 113, 545 P.2d at 279, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 367.
102. CAL. PENAL CODE § 32 (West 1970) and § 496 (West Supp. 1978) forbid, inter
alia, helping a person conceal evidence of his crime or stolen property. One who knew
the location of such an item and refused, on request, to disclose it to the police would
violate the law. A later disclosure would, of course, not act to purge the original
violation.
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require parolees to relinquish their right against unreasonable
searches as a condition of parole. This is also common for pro-
bationers who have committed certain types of criminal offen-
ses.11
The courts have consistently refused to allow these people
to rely on the privacy rights of members of their household to
avoid the implications of their own waiver.'"4 Despite some dif-
ficulty in defining the extent of the parolee's household,10° this
limitation on vicarious exclusion seems necessary to give sub-
stance to the waiver. In effect, it is no different than preventing
one spouse who has consented to a search from objecting to
admission of the fruits on the basis that the other spouse did
not consent. The exception causes few problems of scope; it is
a simple enough matter to determine if a particular individual
has executed a search clause. Moreover, an honest, though mis-
taken, belief by an officer that a person has entered into such
a waiver is not sufficient to permit application of the excep-
tion.'"
In addition to the above exceptions, the courts have im-
posed a standing requirement in several instances that are not
so easily explained and appear to foreshadow a reemerging
standing requirement in the application of the exclusionary
rule.
The Reemergence of Standing in California
Burglars and Trespassers. A growing body of case law sug-
gests that a standing requirement has been imposed on chal-
lenges to violations of the knock-notice regulation of police
entry. The knock-notice statutes are codifications of the com-
mon law designed specifically to alert people inside a residence
to the presence of police officers.'0 It is assumed that this alert
103. Any probation condition must be reasonably related to the crime of which
the defendant is convicted. In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767, 463 P.2d 727, 83 Cal. Rptr.
375 (1970).
104. People v. Kanos, 14 Cal. App. 3d 642, 92 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1971); People v.
Triche, 148 Cal. App. 2d 198, 306 P.2d 616 (1957). Similarly, members of the parolee's
household give up their own rights to be free of warrantless searches of their residence.
Russi v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. App. 3d 160, 108 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1973). However, the
police may not rely on one person's search clause to conduct a search aimed solely at
obtaining evidence against another resident. People v. Pipitone, 86 Cal. App. 3d 681,
152 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1978). Nor may the police search private belongings of the other
resident. People v. Alders, 87 Cal. App. 3d 313, 151 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1978).
105. People v. Carillo, 64 Cal. 2d 387, 412 P.2d 377, 50 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1966).
106. People v. Eastmon, 61 Cal. App. 3d 646, 132 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1976).
107. California regulates the occasions when the police may break into a house
with two parallel statutes: one of which governs warrantless entries, while the other
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reduces the likelihood of violent confrontation between the res-
ident and the police.08 When the occupant is lawfully on the
premises and the alert itself might frustrate the officer's inves-
tigation or increase his peril, the courts have modified the re-
quirements and allowed substantial compliance with the
rules.'"1 Thus, knock-notice limitations have always depended
on who was inside and what that person was doing. This has
given rise to some unfortunate language that presages the exist-
ence of a standing limitation that would deny a trespasser or
burglar the right to challenge the police entry. In People v.
Superior Court (Cook)," 0 the court stated that:
The purposes and policies underlying Penal Code sec-
tion 844 were explained in Duke v. Superior Court": (1) the
protection of the privacy of an individual in his home; (2)
the protection of innocent persons who may also be present
on the premises where an arrest is made; (3) the prevention
of situations which are conducive to violent confrontations
between the occupant and individuals who enter his home
without proper notice [citations]; and (4) the protection
of police who might be injured by a startled and fearful
householder." (emphasis added in Cook decision)
It is immediately apparent that neither of the persons
inside apartment 13 was within the class for whose benefit
and protection the knock-notice requirements of section
844 were enacted. They had no lawful business in the
apartment and in fact were in the very process of burglariz-
ing the premises when Officer Estes arrived."'
applies to entries with a warrant. In pertinent part, CAL. PENAL CODE § 844 (West 1970)
provides:
[A] peace-officer, may break open the door or window of the house in
which the person to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable
grounds for believing him to be, after having demanded admittance and
explained the purpose for which admittance is desired.
CAL. PNAL CODE § 1531 (West 1970) provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house,
or any part of a house or anything therein, to execute the warrant, if, after
notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance.
108. See Duke v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 3d 314, 321, 461 P.2d 628, 632-33, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 348, 352-53 (1969).
The purposes and policies underlying section 844 are fourfold: (1) the
protection of the privacy of the individual in his home; (2) the protection
of innocent persons who may also be present on the premises where an
arrest is made; (3) the prevention of situations which are conducive to
violent confrontations between the occupant and individuals who enter
his home witout proper notice; and (4) the protection of police who might
be injured by a startled and fearful householder.
109. See People v. Maddox, 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956).
110. 69 Cal. App. 3d 686, 138 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1977).
111. Id. at 689-90, 138 Cal. Rptr. at 264.
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In People v. Solario, " the California Supreme Court con-
firmed a series of courts of appeals decisions that had held that
trespassers and burglars were not within the class of people
protected by the knock-notice rule and, therefore, could not
object to its violation."' In Solario, an officer observed two men
outside an apartment building who matched the description of
two suspects in a burglary that had occurred ten days earlier
at the same location. After following them into the building,
the officer found a door on the fourth floor that appeared to
have been recently pried open. The door was open, and the
defendant was acting in a manner that led the officer to con-
clude that a burglary was in progress. Announcing his presence
as he entered, the police officer arrested the defendant and
another man.
The court found that the defendant could not complain of
any knock-notice violations. While the appellate cases had not
specifically adverted to a standing problem, the California
Supreme Court in Solario, in a somewhat confusing manner,
found that the Martin rule was inapposite. The court reasoned
that a burglar could not rely on his victim's privacy violation
because no such violation existed; the officer's entry was de-
signed to protect, not encroach on, that privacy."'
The Solario decision can mean one of two very different
things. First, the decision could mean that a burglar or tres-
passer can never challenge an officer's no-knock entry since, by
definition, a burglar or trespasser is always violating his vic-
tim's privacy. This interpretation, already adopted by two dif-
ferent appellate courts, would, in effect, impose a rule of stand-
ing."5 Secondly, Solario can be viewed as a non-standing deci-
sion interpreting the substance of the knock-notice rules. In
Solario, as well as every other appellate decision that denied
relief to intruders, the officer had substantial reason to believe
that the occupant was an intruder. In such a situation, it makes
sense to deny relief regardless of whether the person was pres-
ent without permission. Thus, if Mr. Solario had actually been
112. 19 Cal. 3d 760, 566 P.2d 627, 139 Cal. Rptr. 725 (1977).
113. People v. Cook, 69 Cal. App. 3d 686, 138 Cal. Rptr. 263 (1977); People v.
Sanchez, 2 Cal. App. 3d 467, 82 Cal. Rptr. 582 (1969); People v. Ortiz, 276 Cal. App.
2d 1, 80 Cal. Rptr. 469 (1969); People v. Medina, 265 Cal. App. 2d 703, 71 Cal. Rptr.
586 (1968).
114. 19 Cal. 3d at 764, 566 P.2d at 629, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
115. The First District in People v. Superior Court (Cleaver), 141 Cal. Rptr. 562(1977) (hearing granted on other grounds January 3, 1978), and the Second District in
People v. Benton, 77 Cal. App. 3d 322, 142 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1978).
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an eccentric resident of the apartment and, following entry, the
police had discovered contraband inside, he would have been
unable to suppress the evidence because the police conduct was
reasonable.
The second proposed interpretation of Solario is more logi-
cal. If a person is calmly sitting in a house and police wrongly
enter without either notice or reason to believe a burglary is
occurring, no good reason exists for denying a challenge to the
entry because in fact the person was a burglar. His status is a
mere fortuity that neither caused the entry nor should preclude
an objection to it.
Whether Solario was wrongly decided or simply incorrectly
interpreted is not yet clear. However, it seems obvious that a
standing limitation has some life in this area. This may reflect
the fact that the knock-notice rule has fallen into general disfa-
vor. The rule is only of statutory, not constitutional, dimen-
sion. Additionally, it has been riddled with exceptions."'
Whatever the reason, the imposition of standing will reduce the
deterrent effect of the rule and increase judicial costs. More-
over, an overlap effect seems likely; police uncertainty as to
the penalty for a violation of this statutory regulation may well
affect their behavior in situations covered by the constitutional
rules on entry.
One court has given an expansive reading to Solario and
denied standing to burglars and trespassers who attempt to
raise constitutional challenges to police entries to the scene of
a crime. People v. Superior Court (Cleaver)"7 recently consid-
ered the shootout of ten years ago between the Oakland police
and the Black Panther party."' Following an exchange of gun-
fire between the police and party members, Eldridge Cleaver
and Bobby Hutton took refuge in the basement of Nellie Pierre.
After the arrest of Cleaver and the shooting of Hutton, the
116. See, e.g., In re William C., 70 Cal. App. 3d 570, 138 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1977)
(no need for express announcement if obviously police); People v. Elder, 63 Cal. App.
3d 731, 134 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1976) (unreasonable delay is refusal of entry); People v.
Keough, 46 Cal. App. 3d 919, 120 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1975) (listing of exigent circumstan-
ces: peril to police, escape of suspect, destruction of evidence).
117. 141 Cal. Rptr.. 562 (1977) (hearing granted on other grounds January 3,
1978).
118. Originally, Cleaver was charged along with David Hilliard. Cleaver left the
country, but Hilliard was prosecuted and convicted for his role in the incident. People
v. Hilliard, 1 Crim. No. 10184 (Div. 1, March 21, 1973). In addition to his challenge to
the search of the Pierre cellar, Cleaver challenged the search of Hilliard's car and,
under Martin, relied on Hilliard's rights. Hilliard had challenged the same search in
his case and lost. The court did not feel bound by the ruling in the earlier case, but
upheld the search. 141 Cal. Rptr. at 576-80.
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police searched the basement and found evidence that Cleaver
sought to suppress on the basis that the search was unreasona-
ble as to Ms. Pierre. Although the court noted that the record
failed to establish whether Cleaver was a trespasser, it held,
relying on Solario, that: "[I]nsofar as the defendant was a
trespasser, he had no standing to assert any violation of the
householder's privacy."''
The Cleaver opinion extends Solario in two ways. First, the
alleged violation of Ms. Pierre's rights was of constitutional,
not statutory, dimension. Secondly, at the time the police en-
tered her cellar, no trespass was in progress. The decision inti-
mates that an intruder cannot challenge a police search of his
victim's premises no matter how long after the intrusion it
occurs. Even assuming the correctness of the Solario decision,
its reasoning should not extend that far.
The police search of the Pierre cellar hours after the depar-
ture of the trespassers cannot reasonably be justified as pro-
tecting the householder's privacy. Nor should the conclusion be
different if Cleaver had simply hidden himself in the cellar and
the police had discovered him while conducting an illegal
house-to-house search of every home in the immediate area. It
would be illogical to deny him the normal benefit of the vicari-
ous exclusion rule on the spurious ground that this search was
designed to protect Ms. Pierre's privacy.
There is also a practical argument for allowing burglars
and trespassers to assert vicarious exclusion generally. It is not
always easy to determine the legitimacy of a person's occu-
pancy, and the owner may have a significant motive to distort.
People v. Shaw2" provides an example. In Shaw, the defendant
was arrested in his girlfriend's car. Marijuana was found in a
storage compartment on the ledge behind the rear seats. The
court affirmed the trial court's denial of the suppression motion
on the basis that the search was valid. Of interest is the concur-
ring opinion, which noted that the girlfriend's uncontradicted
testimony indicated that the defendant had stolen her car. The
concurrence argued that, for this reason, the defendant should
have no standing to raise an objection to the search of the
automobile.2 ' It is not difficult to see the incentive of owners
of vehicles or houses to put as much distance as possible be-
tween themselves and contraband found hidden on their prem-
119. 141 Cal. Rptr. at 571.
120. 21 Cal. App. 3d 710, 98 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1971).
121. Id. at 715-17, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 727 (Herndon, J., concurring).
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ises. It would be unfortunate if this motivation were ignored in
deciding to insulate searches from judicial review on the basis
that the defendant is alleged to be a trespasser or thief.
Abandonment. In addition to the express limitations on
the vicarious exclusion rule, California courts have precluded
other defendants from challenging searches and seizures with-
out any consideration of the vicarious exclusion doctrine or the
policies it reflects. In several of the so-called "abandonment"
cases, the courts have found that a defendant who discards
property loses any right to question an official search or seizure
of it.2' In People v. Smith,'23 Smith and Walker were prose-
cuted for murdering two police officers. After fleeing the scene
in a car he had rented two weeks earlier, Smith left the vehicle
on a side street and traveled by public transportation. Evi-
dence was seized from the automobile two days later without
a warrant. The court refused to hear any argument about the
legality of the seizure, stating: "It may reasonably be inferred
from such conduct that Smith had abandoned any interest he
possessed in either the car or its contents . . . .The police
therefore were free to seize and search the vehicle without fear
of infringing any of Smith's constitutional rights." 2'
The abandonment doctrine may be a legitimate method of
disposing of Smith's own rights vis-a-vis the search, but Smith
should have been able to raise the rights of the car owner under
the Martin rule. In upholding the conviction, the court did not
even discuss vicarious exclusion. There is no question that if
Smith had been found walking next to the car and denied he
knew anything about it or its contents, no standing require-
ment would hinder his challenge to any subsequent search.25
It makes no sense to distinguish this hypothetical set of facts
from what actually happened in deciding whether the defen-
dant can be heard.
The Smith problem becomes greater if one concludes that
the defendant was hiding the vehicle when he left it on a side
street between two other cars to prevent a quick check on its
license plates. 2 If hiding property in a place one does not con-
122. See People v. Ketchum, 45 Cal. App. 3d 328, 119 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1975);
People v. Superior Court (Barrett), 23 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 100 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1972);
People v. Smith, 63 Cal. 2d 779, 409 P.2d 222, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1966).
123. 63 Cal. 2d 779, 409 P.2d 222, 48 Cal. Rptr. 382 (1966).
124. Id. at 800-01, 409 P.2d at 236-37, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 396-97.
125. See People v. Gale, 9 Cal. 3d 788, 511 P.2d 1204, 108 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1973).
126. 63 Cal. 2d at 800, 409 P.2d at 236, 48 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
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trol forfeits the right to argue for its suppression, a significant
gap is opened in the vicarious exclusion doctrine.
In People v. Superior Court (Barrett),'27 the court of ap-
peals came quite close to equating hiding and abandonment.
Officer Rivera had learned that the defendant and his common
law wife, Susan Sinclair, were selling drugs from their resi-
dence. Rivera called the Barrett home from a neighbor's and
informed Sinclair that the police were aware of their enterprise
and on the way. With the neighbor's permission, Rivera then
observed Sinclair exit her home with a green bag and look in
all directions. Another officer saw her place the bag inside a
neighbor's trash can. Without the neighbor's permission, one
of the officers then seized the green bag. The bag was later
found to contain contraband. The neighbor testified at the sup-
pression hearing that the defendants were permitted to use her
trash can. For reasons best known to the court, it concluded
that Sinclair had abandoned the bag and, with it, any right to
challenge the seizure.
When Sinclair cast the trash bag into Mrs. Dorman's gar-
bage can, any reasonable expectation of privacy was for-
saken by her. She had no reason to expect that Mrs. Dor-
man would condone her illegal activities or cooperate in
the concealment of the contraband. In a very real sense,
Sinclair abandoned the trash bag when she cast it into her
neighbor's garbage can. There can be nothing unlawful in
the seizure of abandoned property. 8
It should be noted that, in both Smith and Barrett, the
defendant was the target of the search. This heightens the
anomaly in denying standing in those cases, while granting it
to defendants who claim they never possessed the items discov-
ered. One of the major reasons for the vicarious exclusion rule
is the attempt to make exclusion less haphazard; that is, to
regularize the loss of incentives for illegal police conduct. 9
Should the courts continue to treat abandonment cases in the
manner suggested by Smith, the utility of vicarious exclusion
would be called into question.
There is no clear explanation for the decisions in Cleaver,
Smith, and Barrett. It is likely that the California courts of
appeals are more ambivalent about the exclusionary rule than
is the supreme court and are, therefore, less sanguine about
127. 23 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 100 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1972).
128. Id. at 1010, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 607.
129. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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discarding standing. This explanation of Cleaver and Barrett
is unavailing to Smith. It is possible that Smith and the other
abandonment cases reflect the non-comprehensive nature of
the adjudicative process; Smith may have been decided with-
out any thought to, much less rejection of, vicarious exclusion.
One hesitates to reach that conclusion, particularly since a
leading decision on attorney incompetence held that the de-
fense attorney's unawareness of the Martin rule reduced his
representation to a sham and a farce.'1
Perhaps we are seeing a loss of faith in the broad protection
of privacy afforded by the California courts. If standing at the
federal level can be explained by an ambivalence toward the
exclusionary rule, perhaps it is an ambivalence towards certain
substantive regulations of police conduct that gives the doc-
trine its strength at the state level. Thus, in Smith, the defen-
dant would have relied on the car owner's right to be free of a
warrantless search of a vehicle parked in the downtown area for
two days. It is not surprising that a court might seek to leave
that right intact without enforcing it on every occasion. A
standing requirement, whether express or not, provides the
means for accomplishing that.
Judicial reluctance to grant standing in Solario and
Cleaver is understandable, although not doctrinally correct. It
is one thing to assert that a defendant can vicariously raise the
rights of another. It is quite a different issue to say that a
burglar can rely on the privacy violation of the very individual
on whose privacy he intruded. Certainly no case has directly
held that a defendant can raise his victim's rights.' Argu-
ments in favor of vicarious exclusion in these situations may,
therefore, be unavailing.
Certain observations about the effects of imposing a stand-
ing requirement in these cases can be made. In those areas
where it is applied expressly, the courts will be taxed both in
130. People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963).
131. Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971)
(discussed in text accompanying note 82 supra), could, with some imagination, be
viewed as a case where a defendant relied on the privacy rights of his victim. The
defendant was charged with selling drugs to a minor. In analogous circumstances, the
minor has been held to be a "victim" and not an accomplice in the transaction. Thus,
in a charge of lewd conduct with a minor (CAL. PENAL CODE § 288 (Deering Supp.
1978)), though the minor consents, he is not an accomplice, but the victim. See
People v. Perez, 9 Cal. 3d 651, 510 P.2d 1026, 108 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1973); People v.
Westek, 31 Cal. 2d 469, 190 P.2d 9 (1948). It is clear that the purchaser of drugs is not
the seller's accomplice. People v. Labe, 43 Cal. App. 3d 766, 119 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1974).
Thus, arguably, the minor purchaser in a drug sales case is the victim. The defendant
in Kaplan relied on the privacy rights of the minor purchaser to suppress the evidence.
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time and dignity by the attempt to distinguish between the
objections of similarly situated persons. For example, courts
will have to determine at what point an individual loses his
status as a guest and becomes a trespasser because of criminal
conduct that the host denies knowledge of. While this increase
in judicial cost occurs only in the specific cases where standing
is required, a diminution in the effectiveness of the exclusion-
ary rule could be more widespread as the exaction of penalties
for unlawful police conduct becomes less certain. The silent
imposition of standing in the abandonment cases is at once less
rational and less harmful: less rational because the merits of
the issue are never considered; less harmful because no judicial
costs are involved and because police conduct is less likely to
be affected. The very fact that the standing requirement in the
abandonment cases is hidden is both its most objectionable
and most attractive feature.
Relationship of the Vicarious Standing Rule to the Fruit-of-
the-Poisonous- Tree Doctrine
Judicial decisions in a related, though distinct, area must
be considered in analyzing the overall application of vicarious
exclusion in California. The "fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree" doc-
trine is a rule used to determine which products of an unlawful
search are tainted and must be excluded." 2 When the Martin
rule is relied on to challenge the search or arrest of a person who
provides information against the defendant, 3' both doctrines
may be called into play. Manipulation of the poisoned fruit
rule can then have an effect on the vitality of vicarious exclu-
sion. People v. Johnson' and People v. Eastmon135 demon-
strate the interplay of the two rules.
In Johnson, the police searched the home of one Howard
and found a television set stolen in one of the burglaries
charged against the defendant. Howard was later arrested and,
after being shown the set, confessed, implicating Johnson.
Johnson was arrested the next day and initially denied com-
plicity. He was then taken to Howard's residence. Howard
joined the police and Johnson in the police car and repeated
his confession, again naming Johnson. The defendant then con-
fessed. The attorney general conceded that the search in which
132. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 407 (1963).
133. See text accompanying notes 81-83 supra.
134. 70 Cal. 2d 541, 450 P.2d 865, 75 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969).
135. 61 Cal. App. 3d 646, 132 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1976).
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the televison was found was illegal.' 31 The court had no diffi-
culty in finding that Martin and not Varnum'3 applied: even
though Howard's statement induced Johnson's confession, the
search that produced the television was the primary illegality.
Thus, Johnson had standing to challenge the search of How-
ard's home.' 38 The court had a more difficult time in finding
that the taint of the illegal search had not been attenuated.
Despite a strong dissent by Justice Mosk, who found the major-
ity opinion in the style of Jacula Prudentum,'3" the court found
that Johnson's statement was induced by exploiting the evi-
dence found in the illegal search of Howard's home, and no
intervening act had served to attenuate the taint.
Eastmon presents a far narrower view of the fruit-of-the-
poisonous-tree rule. In that case an officer illegally entered the
home of Summers and Nicol and found heroin. The officer
sought their assistance in setting-up the defendant for an arrest
for the sale of drugs. To gain their aid he assured them that
they would not be prosecuted for the heroin he had found, that
he would not disclose the information to Summers' probation
officer, and that he would try to assist Nicol on her pending
charge of possession of heroin for sale. Within hours, the couple
purchased heroin from the defendant with marked bills. That
evening, the officer executed a search warrant and found the
marked bills in Eastmon's possession.
It is manifest that the court did not want to suppress the
evidence. While conceding the illegality of the warrantless
entry into the Summers-Nicol residence, the court went to
great lengths to note that the officer had probable cause to
believe that Summers was in possession of heroin and had a
good faith belief that Summers had consented to a warrantless
search of his home as a condition of probation."' The trial court
implemented its reluctance to suppress by finding that the,
defendant lacked standing."' The court of appeals saw Martin
as an insurmountable barrier to this approach,"' but reached
136. 70 Cal. 2d at 545, 450 P.2d at 867, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 403.
137. See text accompanying notes 97-101 supra.
138. 70 Cal. 2d at 553, 450 P.2d at 872-73, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 408-09.
139. Id. at 558, 450 P.2d at 876, 75 Cal. Rptr. at 412.
For want of a nail the shoe is lost, for want of a shoe the horse is lost, for
want of a horse the rider is lost.
G. Herbert, Jacula Prudentum, in HERVERT'S REMAiNs (1652).
140. 61 Cal. App. 3d at 652, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 513. Summers himself thought he
had agreed to such a condition. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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the same result by finding the taint of the illegal entry atten-
uated. It noted that the evidence against the defendant was not
found in Summer's home but was produced by the
"intervening unregenerate heart" of Eastmon.11
Courts have some flexibility in interpreting the fruit-of-
the-poisonous-tree doctrine. A narrow interpretation in situa-
tions like Eastmon will seriously undercut the deterrent effect
of exclusion by insulating more than a few cases from judicial
review. In narcotics enforcement, particularly, police investiga-
tions assume the existence of "little fish" who can be per-
suaded to identify sources and work with the police to arrange
controlled purchases from. them. The only prosecutions under-
taken in this practice are of the "higher ups." If the poisoned
fruit doctrine precludes judicial review of the initial police act
on the basis that it is an isolated event, the reality of the police
procedure is ignored, and significant incentives for illegality at
the early stages continue.
CONCLUSION
There are numerous criticisms of the exclusionary rule: it
entails a significant social cost in the freeing of guilty persons;
it operates in only a small area of police investigation; and its
deterrent effect is largely an unprovable assumption. There is
good reason to believe, however, that prosecutorial authorities
govern their actions not by the scope of the fourth amendment
but by the breadth of the suppression doctrine. California's
adoption of vicarious exclusion seems wise because it is admin-
istratively easier, is more equitable, and increases the deterrent
effect of the exclusionary rule. Vicarious exclusion makes man-
ifest that there is no judicial imprimatur to search the little guy
unlawfully. It deters unlawful searches and seizures by making
application of the suppression doctrine more systematic.
Therefore, it is unfortunate that a standing requirement has
begun to reemerge. Regardless of the reasons for the tenacity
of the standing rule, the exceptions to vicarious exclusion
threaten to undermine that doctrine as well as the exclusionary
143. Id. at 654, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 514. See also United States v. Ceccolini, 435
U.S. 268 (1978), in which a person present at the time of an illegal search was asked
about the fruit of the search and made a statement that incriminated the defendant.
That witness then willingly appeared at trial to testify against Ceccolini. The Court
suggested that the witness' willingness to appear may be a sufficient intervening act
to attenuate the taint.
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rule generally. As it becomes less certain that unlawful police
conduct will be thwarted by the exclusion of evidence, the
scope of fourth amendment rights becomes similarly uncertain.

